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Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between school-level accountability practices and 
science achievement of 15-year-olds, across four counties: Australia, Korea, Portugal, and the United 
States. We used PISA 2006 data, since 2006 is the only administration that has focused on science. 
School-level accountability practices are here defined as activities that: (a) provide school 
achievement data to external stakeholders, or (b) establish consequences according to the 
achievement results. Using linear regression analysis, we found that school-level accountability 
practices varied across these four countries, albeit not all pairs of countries were significantly 
different from each other in this regard. Using hierarchical linear modelling, we found that school-
level accountability practices had a small effect on science achievement. Importantly, this effect was 
not independent of schools’ and students’ socio-economic status. 
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Investigando la relación entre medidas de rendición de cuentas por parte de las escuelas 
y el desempeño en ciencias  
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Resumen: Este estudio busca comprender la relación entre prácticas de rendición de cuentas 
por parte de las escuelas, y el desempeño en ciencias de estudiantes de 15 años, en cuatro países: 
Australia, Corea del Sur, Portugal, y Estados Unidos. Este estudio usa los datos de PISA 2006 
por ser la última administración enfocada en ciencias. Las prácticas de rendición de cuentas de 
las escuelas se refieren aquí a aquellas prácticas que: (a) proveen datos de desempeño académico 
a terceros, o (b) establecen consecuencias en función de dichos resultados. Usando regresión 
lineal, encontramos diferencias significativas en las prácticas de rendición de cuentas adoptadas 
por las escuelas de distintos países. Sin embargo, no todos los pares de países son diferentes 
entre sí bajo este criterio. Usando análisis multinivel encontramos que el efecto de estas 
prácticas en el desempeño en ciencias es pequeño. En particular, este efecto no es independiente 
del nivel socio-económico de las escuelas y alumnos. 
Palabras-clave: rendición de cuentas;  desempeño en ciencias; pruebas internacionales 
 
Estudo da relação entre prestação de contas das escolas e desempenho em ciência 
Resumo: Este estudo investiga a relação entre práticas de prestação de contas no nível escolar e 
o desempenho em ciências entre jovens de 15 anos de quarto países: Austrália, Coréia, Portugal, 
e Estados Unidos. Nós usamos dados do PISA de 2006 já que este é o único ano em que a 
administração teve foco em ciência. Práticas de prestação de contas são aqui definidas como 
atividades que: (a) fornecem dados de desempenho escolar para as partes interessadas, ou (b) 
estabelecem consequências relacionadas aos dados de desempenho. Usando análise de regressão 
linear, descobrimos que práticas de prestação de contas no nível escolar variaram entre os quatro 
países, mas nem todos os pares de países foram significativamente diferentes neste aspecto. 
Usando modelagen linear hierárquica, encontramos que estas práticas tiveram um efeito 
pequeno no desempenho em ciência. Importantemente, este efeito não foi independente do 
nível sócio-econômico das escolas e dos alunos. 
Palavras-chave: prestação de contas; desempenho em ciencias; testes internacionais  
 
Investigating the Relationship between School Level Accountability 
Practices and Science Achievement  
 
Educational policies across several nations have increased their focus on the learning 
outcomes achieved by students, to ensure that students are not only attending schools but acquiring 
new and relevant knowledge (Centre of Study for Policies and Practices in Education (CEPPE), 
2013; Hanushek & Raymond, 2006; Women Thrive Worldwide, 2015). This current focus on 
students’ outcomes requires greater scrutiny on the development of reliable measures and valid uses 
and interpretations of scores. The change in educational policies has, therefore, been accompanied 
by an expansion and improvement of test practices against a common set of expectations (Hanushek 
& Raymond, 2006). In order to assure that students meet such expectations, policy-makers have 
designed systems of rewards and penalties for the agents responsible for these outcomes. These 
practices – known as accountability mechanisms – have been well established in the economic field 
(principal-agent theory; see Laffont & Martimort, 2002 or Mas-Collel, Whinston, & Green, 1995) 
and have been increasingly used by educational policy-makers. 
 
Accountability Systems 
 
Accountability systems are the sets of mechanisms and instruments that attach consequences to 
the accomplishment of well-established objectives, to ensure that several agents meet their obligations 
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(Hatch, 2013; Wobmann, Luderman, Schutz, & West, 2007). Theoretically, accountability in 
education is mainly supported by the principal-agent theory, which states that establishing proper 
incentives to agents – who perform service – will align their interests with those of the principals – 
who commission the service – and will ensure an efficient delivery (Polikoff, McEachin, & Wrabel, 
2014; Wobmann et al., 2007). Under this schema, schools (agents) are conceived as providers of 
education (service) to students, on behalf of the state, or country, or parents, etc. (principals). 
Theoretically, the relationship between principals and agents is mostly jeopardized by divergent 
interests and by decentralized information (Wobmann et al., 2007). If the agent has control over the 
information about his/her performance and/or if the agent has other interests than those of the 
principal, there is a risk that the agent pursues his own interests at the expense of the quality of the 
service provided. Therefore, accountability systems rely on two mechanisms: (a) establishing rewards 
or penalties to differential attainment of goals, and (b) providing transparent information about the 
agents’ performance. Clearly, accountability in education depends largely on the type and quality of 
the information provided to educators and “consumers” (Polikoff et al., 2014).  
Accountability systems in education typically consist of three components: (a) achievement 
standards, (b) measures of student performance, and (c) a system of consequences attached to the 
latter (Wobmann et al., 2007). On one hand, achievement standards set the expectations to which 
agents will be held accountable. Standards can be thought of as definitions of what someone should 
know and be able to do to be considered competent (CEPPE, 2013). While there are different types 
of standards – content, assessment, and performance standards – their purpose is to make clear and 
explicit the learning expectations for pupils in schools (CEPPE, 2013). On the other hand, the 
measures of student performance provide information about the extent to which students are 
achieving their learning expectations. There are multiple ways to measure student achievement. 
Countries typically use student assessments as the measure of performance used for accountability 
purposes (Rosenkvist, 2010). Accountability systems that are mainly based on the results of large-
scale testing programs are known as test-based accountability systems. Last, the system of consequences 
attached to the measures of student performance, refer to the rewards and penalties assigned to the 
agents in relation to their accomplishments. Regarding these rewards and penalties, an accountability 
system may be high-stakes – that is, when significant advantages and/or disadvantages are coupled 
with the test results –- or low stakes – when no such couplings exist (Rosenkvist, 2010).  
 
The Unclear Effectiveness of Accountability on Improving Student Achievement 
 
Countries differ in relation to how they implement accountability systems (Rosenkvist, 
2010). Among other variations, accountability systems may: (a) use one or multiple measures of 
performance (Polikoff et al., 2014; Rosenkvist, 2010); (b) be defined by external authorities – external 
– or be left-up to the agents – internal  (Hatch, 2013); (c) be high-stakes or low-stakes (Rosenkvist, 
2010); (d) have different agents (schools, teachers, etc.) or different principals (centralized 
authorities, parents, etc.) (Rosenkvist, 2010); (e) fulfill different functions (Haertel, 2013; Klenowski, 
2011; Rosenkvist, 2010); and (f) have differential consequences on educational systems (Rosenkvist, 
2010). In particular, standards linked to high-stakes external assessments and accountability 
measures represent one pole, whereas using standards as suggested guidelines and assessing their 
achievement through low-stakes assessments represents the other pole (CEPPE, 2013).  
Several researchers have attempted to understand the effects that different accountability 
systems have on educational outcomes. Specifically, evidence of the effect of accountability systems 
on student achievement emerges from various lines of research. On one hand, researchers have 
looked at the effect that testing per se has on student achievement. While some show that testing 
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across multiple conditions (e.g. Phelps, 2012) may increase achievement, others claim that there is 
no conclusive evidence or convincing support to the idea that testing improves student achievement 
(e.g. Lee, 2008; Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2012). On the other hand, researchers have looked at the 
relationship between the level of pressure of the accountability systems – that is, their stakes – and 
the effect on student achievement. Again, there is no consensus among researchers, with some 
providing evidence that high stakes tests are particularly effective in improving achievement (e.g. 
Phelps, 2012), and others providing evidence that accountability pressure may be correlated with 
student achievement but does not explain changes in achievement over time (e.g. Nichols et al., 
2012). Some make the distinction that high-stakes exit examinations increase student achievement 
(Bishop, 1997), but that this is only true if clear standards and goals are set (Wobmann et al., 2007).  
This relationship is hard to isolate because of the multiple effects, agents, and layers that are 
operating within accountability systems. High-stakes test-based accountability systems have been 
largely criticized because they have unintended negative consequences on the curriculum, 
instructional practices, and other educational processes. Many researchers have pointed out that 
using high-stakes tests has led to an overconcentration of teaching on the content areas that are 
tested or to a narrowing of the curriculum (CEPPE, 2013; Judson, 2012; Koretz, 2008; Rosenkvist, 2010). 
Others have stated that making tests so predominant creates strategic behaviors to increase test 
scores that may be detrimental for instruction – such as the teaching to the test (Rosenkvist, 2010). 
Other detrimental consequences of high-stakes test-based accountability systems include: (a) the 
creation of diverse forms of practices that discriminate low ability students such as section based on 
prior achievement (CEPPE, 2013); (b) score inflation (Koretz, 2008); (c) incentives to cheat or an 
increment on the levels of cheating (Rosenkvist, 2010); and (d) an excessive deployment of resources 
in maintaining these systems (Rosenkvist, 2010). 
Researchers recognize that the major goal of federal and state high-stakes testing policies is 
to improve schools (Nichols et al., 2012), and teachers - as well as other stakeholders -  believe that 
tests are important in the educational policy agenda and tend to do more good than harm 
(Rosenkvist, 2010). Moreover, standards based policies are common among high performing 
educational systems and may carry a number of positive effects in educational systems (CEPPE, 
2013; Klenowski, 2011; Schleicher, 2011). Therefore, test-based accountability systems should 
integrate the best of both worlds, and such policies should achieve their main purpose of improving 
schooling and students’ performance. However, the success of accountability systems depends 
largely on other characteristics of the system, such as capacity-building at the school level (Hatch, 
2013; Rosenkvist, 2010; Schleicher, 2011), and specifically, the adequate balance between 
accountability measures and those aimed at building capacities in the system (CEPPE, 2013). It is 
not enough to add pressure to the educational system so as to mobilize it towards improvement, but 
the conditions to generate this improvement need to be created or supported. The effectiveness of 
these systems also depends on the quality of the measures used (validity, reliability), the transparency 
of the incentive mechanisms, the consequences on equity and fairness, and the evidence that the 
positive intended outcomes surpass the effects of indirect purposes or of unintended consequences 
(Haertel, 2013; Polikoff et al., 2014).  
The effect that an accountability program has on different levels of student performance 
remains unanswered (Judson, 2012). Mixed and inconclusive findings arise partly due to the fact that 
researchers look at different types of accountability (e.g. school, student), with differential levels of 
stakes, with different dependent variables and time periods, among other characteristics of the 
analyses (Lee, 2008). For example, the effect of accountability on student achievement is different 
for mathematics than for science (Lee, 2008). In light of the current prominence that accountability 
systems have in educational systems, more evidence about the nature of the relationship between 
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accountability and achievement is needed. In this study we look at the relationship between school 
level accountability practices and science achievement of 15-year-olds, across four countries, based 
on the results of a low-stakes large-scale test. We examine the relationship that certain school level 
accountability practices may have with achievement. Drawing on the principal-agent theory, the 
school level accountability practices considered refer to school practices aimed at increasing 
transparency and/or establishing consequences in relation to achievement results. We focus on 
science achievement because previous studies have mostly looked at the relationship that 
accountability has had on mathematics and/or reading achievement and not on science achievement. 
Looking at the relationship between school level accountability practices and science achievement is 
informative because it allows us to expand the scope of what we know about the relationship 
between accountability and achievement. Moreover, science education is considered critical for the 
development of nations in the current economic context (Carnegie Corporation of New York and 
Institute for Advanced Study, 2009). Therefore, focusing on science becomes relevant, as nations are 
increasingly interested in improving scientific literacy of their citizens, particularly, a scientific literacy 
that enables connections between science knowledge and societal issues (Hofstein, Eilks, & Bybee, 
2011). 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between school level 
accountability practices and science achievement of 15-year-old students, across four countries: 
Australia, Korea, Portugal, and United States. Specifically, the research questions that we answer are: 
1. Do school level accountability practices vary across these four countries? 
2. Is there a relationship between the extent of school level accountability practices and 15-year-
olds’ science achievement?  
 
Methodology 
 
Data 
 
The data for this study come from PISA 2006 database. The Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) is an international assessment program that measures the skills and 
knowledge of 15-year-olds across three domains: literacy, mathematics, and science (Organization 
for the Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 2007). Since 2000, the assessment 
takes place every three years and is administered across a large number of countries and economies. 
PISA is described as being “forward-looking” because it focuses on the ability of students to use 
their knowledge and skills to meet real life challenges (OECD, 2009). PISA is not measuring the 
curricula of the participating countries and economies, but rather focuses on skills that are not 
necessarily linked to them.  
Complementary questionnaires are administered to students, school principals, and parents, 
to gather information that is relevant to explain and contextualize students’ outcomes. Two of these 
questionnaires are mandatory: (a) the student questionnaire and (b) the school questionnaire. The 
first is administered to students in order to gather information about their individual characteristics 
with special focus on demographic and socioeconomic aspects. The second is administered to 
school principals in order to gather relevant information about the schools which students attend.  
Every PISA administration focuses on a single domain. This focus has two implications. On 
one hand, more achievement data are collected for that subject. On the other hand, the 
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complementary questionnaires collect information around variables that are exclusively related to the 
given subject. For that reason, this study uses 2006 data, as PISA 2006 is the most recent 
administration to focus on science. Key variables such as the interest in science, are not available in 
more recent datasets (2009 & 2012). 
 
Case Selection 
 
PISA 2006 was administered to 57 countries and economies. For parsimony and 
interpretability, we selected four countries based on their differences on the following criteria: (a) 
gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), (b) the percentage of GDP annually spent in 
research and development (GERD), (c) geography (continent), and (d) language. These variables 
were selected in order to represent different socio-economic realities (GDP per capita, geography), 
cultural realities (language, geography), and the importance that science has in each (GERD). While 
we acknowledge that GERD relates to all resources put into research and development regardless of 
their subject area (i.e.: the research could be in humanities or in physics), we also know that natural 
sciences and engineering are among the most expensive disciplines and typically take the larger share 
of such expenditures (OECD, 2014).  
The database used for this selection was built by one of the authors using the OECD and 
World Bank databases. Values for 2006 were used for the GDP per capita and GERD values. 
Among those countries and economies for which we had full information, we selected the four 
countries which differed the most among these variables. The GDP per capita and GERD variables 
were dichotomized (low, high) and the geography and language variables were nominal. If two 
countries differed on one variable, their distance increased by one.  
The selected countries were Australia, Korea, Portugal, and USA. These countries have 
similarities and differences in terms of these variables. Australia was among the countries with high 
GDP per capita and high GERD; Korea was among the countries with low GDP per capita and 
high GERD; Portugal was among the counties with low GDP per capita and low GERD; and USA 
was among the countries with high GDP per capita and high GERD. Except for Australia and USA, 
the official languages are different for these countries. Last, all of them are located in different 
continents.  
These countries also present similarities and differences in terms of national level testing 
practices. By 2006, Australia did not have a national testing program or national standards and only 
used locally developed tests for evaluation purposes (Klenowski, 2011). However, in 2009 Australia 
established a National Assessment Program (NAP) which is an annual assessment for students in 
grades 3, 5, 7 and 9 (Rosenkvist, 2010). It measures four domains: reading, writing, language 
conventions, and numeracy (Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA), 
2014b). In addition, from 2003-on it administers sample assessments in three subjects for students in 
grades 6 and 10, including science literacy (ACARA, 2014b). This assessment is only administered to 
grade level 6. The results are not used to punish schools or teachers but are publicly available.  
Korea has a national level system of diagnostic assessments for primary and secondary 
education, namely, the National Assessment on Educational Achievement (NAEA). The program 
was launched more than 60 years ago, but has been fully implemented for only 16 years. In 
particular, before 2008, the NAEA was administered to a representative sample of students from 
grade levels 6, 9 and 101. However, after that year, Korea began administering the NAEA to all 
students enrolled in primary and secondary education. From that year on, assessment results became 
                                                 
1 Middle school 3rd graders and high school 1st graders. 
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publicly available and began being used for certain accountability purposes (Korean Educational 
Development Institute, 2010). Notwithstanding, at the time when students took PISA these policies 
were not yet in place. The subject matters assessed include Korean, mathematics, English (some 
grade levels), social sciences, and science.  
On the other hand, Portugal has a national standardized test (summative) administered to 
students in Grade 4 in two curricular areas: Portuguese and mathematics (Santiago, Donaldson, 
Looney, & Nusche, 2012). The objective of this low-stakes assessment is to inform stakeholders 
about students’ performance. Other national examinations are used at the end of Grades 6, 9 and 11 
or 12. These are not dominant for the final mark and also measure achievement in Portuguese and 
mathematics. Overall, in Portugal there is an emphasis on internal formative assessments led by 
teachers. In fact, external assessments were implemented partly to support internal based evaluation 
systems. Also, teachers and schools have considerable autonomy to define the assessment criteria 
(Santiago et al., 2012). These tests were in place before 2006.  
The United States has one national assessment, the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP). For more than 40 years, NAEP collects and reports information about academic 
achievement on nationally representative samples. The results are widely reported and inform 
government evaluation of the condition and progress of education (Rosenkvist, 2010). Science is 
one of the many subjects assessed. However, science is not assessed every year. Between 2006 and 
2014 there were only two years in which science was one of the subjects nationally assessed 
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2015). Despite having one single and low-stakes national 
level assessment, the United States currently operates a mandatory nation-wide state accountability 
test-based system. Under the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001, schools and districts are 
held accountable for student achievement. States must measure student progress in reading, 
mathematics, and science achievement, to all students. In the cases of mathematics and reading, 
assessments are administered for grades 3 through 8. In the case of science, assessments have to be 
administered at least once during grades 3-5, grades 6-9, and grades 10-12. For accountability 
purposes, several outcomes and performance indicators associated with these tests have to be 
reported and met. Consequences are attached to the results, making these tests high stakes to 
schools and districts. States may choose to include science achievement for this accountability 
function or not. By 2012, 11 states have chosen to use science achievement in the accountability 
calculations (Judson, 2012).  
The states’ testing programs and accountability systems are embedded in a political context 
that permits some flexibility and therefore, variation across them. From 2011, states were allowed to 
apply for waivers of the key requirements of the NCLB (CEP, 2012). To date, most states have 
approved or extended waivers in place, and these waivers have brought several changes to state-level 
accountability systems. For example, states with NCLB waivers have modified some of their goals, 
such as the 100% proficiency in reading and mathematics for all students. Some have also expanded 
their range of annual measurable objectives (AMOs) or targets of performance which schools have 
to meet in order to make adequately yearly progress. Some states have established different AMOs 
for different students’ sub-groups. Or for instance, some states have implemented new and complex 
performance indexes to evaluate the yearly progress of schools (CEP, 2012). In particular, one of the 
important changes that these “waiver states” could face is related to the achievement standards to be 
measured by the large-scale tests used in the accountability process. The current policy is such that 
these states had/have to adopt “college and career-ready standards” and use assessments aligned to 
these standards (CEP, 2012). To be college- and career-ready means that “a high school graduate has 
the knowledge and skills in English and mathematics necessary to qualify for and succeed in entry-
level, credit-bearing postsecondary coursework without the need for remediation” (Achieve, 2014).  
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Some of the waiver states adopted the Common Core State Standards (Council of Chief 
State School Officers (CCSSO) & the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices 
(NGA Center, 2014) which are meant to provide college and career readiness high-quality standards 
in mathematics and English language arts/literacy. It is expected that these states adopt the 
assessment systems developed by either Smarter Balanced (Smarter Balanced, 2014) or Partnership 
for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC) (PARCC, 2014), two state consortia 
that are developing high quality assessment systems aligned to the common core state standards. 
Beyond the differences across the states in terms of waivers, the adoption of common assessment 
systems could create “multi-state” accountability system. However, some legislators are currently 
pushing for a reauthorization of the NCLB act which in case of approval, might change the 
accountability scenario importantly. In particular, the current draft of the NCLB reauthorization – 
called the Every Child Achieves Act of 2015 – advocates for limiting the faculties of the Secretary of 
Education in states’ decisions on how to assess and what to assess (Ravitch, 2015; Schneider, 2015). 
Notably, one of the prohibitions to the Secretary is that of requiring a State to enter into a voluntary 
partnership as a condition of approval of a waiver, among other conditions (Schneider, 2015). 
Therefore, it is possible that some waiver states decide to drop out from assessment consortia if the 
new Act is approved and its essential dispositions are kept. In sum, the accountability and testing 
practices will continue to undergo important changes, depending on the modifications of the 
educational policies that define them. To date, the United States educational system has one national 
testing system and overall, is and remains a test-intensive country.  
 
Table 1.  
Characteristics of the selected countries  
     Assessments 
Country GERD 
GDP per 
Capitaa Continent Language National Science 
Australia High 
(1.97%) 
High 
(36 M) 
Oceania English Publicly available 
without direct 
punishment 
Yes (sample) 
Korea High 
(3.01%) 
Low 
(21 M) 
Asia Korean Publicly available 
with increasing uses 
Yes 
Portugal Low 
(1.02%) 
Low 
(20 M) 
Europe Portuguese Low-stakes No 
USA High 
(2.61%) 
High 
(46 M) 
America English High-stakes Yes, but not 
on regular 
basis 
(representative 
sample) 
Note. Current information. GERD corresponds to the Gross Expenditure in Research and 
Development. GDP per capita corresponds to the Gross Domestic Product divided by the total 
population.  
aCurrent USD. These values were updated using the current World Bank database and are very close to 
those used to select the countries. 
 
Variables 
 
To answer the first research question, we needed a variable that could provide varying levels 
of accountability practices at schools. Because we were interested in accountability practices 
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generally, and did not care about specific accountability practices, we built an overall accountability 
index from questions 15 and 17 of the school questionnaire administered by PISA (see Appendix 
A). Question 15 explored aspects of accountability to parents, and was composed of three yes/no 
items. Question 17 explored the ways in which schools used achievement data, and was composed 
of five yes/no items. Under the assumption that all items contributed equally to the overall 
accountability level of a school, we added the eight yes/no items and created our index. The coding 
of questions 15 and 17 was such that for every “yes” answer, a “1” was assigned to the data, and for 
every “no” answer, a “2” was assigned. Therefore, we reversed the index and created the variable 
inverse overall accountability (ACC). The inverse overall accountability is an ordinal variable, ranging 
from eight to sixteen.  
In addition, we created three dummy variables for the different countries. The dummy 
variables were Australia (AUS), Korea (KOR), and Portugal (POR). Other variables that were of  
interest in the context of the first question, were those variables that could importantly influence the 
overall accountability level of schools. We only created variables for which we had information for 
the four countries. Therefore, we could not use the type of funding of school (private vs. public) as a 
variable in our analysis, because that information was not available for Australia. However, we were 
able to build variables that referred to the levels of influence and pressure that different stakeholders 
exerted on different school decisions. In particular, using data from questions 12 and 16 of the 
school questionnaire (see Appendix B), we built five variables: (a) internal influence on budgeting 
and staffing (IBS), (b) internal influence on instructional content and assessment practices (IIA), (c) 
external influence on budgeting and staffing (EBS), (d) external influence on instructional content 
and assessment practices (EIA), and (e) parental pressure (PP). 
In relation to our second research question, we needed a measure for science achievement. 
We defined science achievement as the average of the five plausible values that PISA reports for 
each student. PISA uses a sampling method in which students are not exposed to all science 
questions. Plausible values provide an estimate of student achievement as that student would have 
answered all of the questions.  
Other variables that were relevant to our second research question were those student level 
variables that have been consistently found significant in previous studies on science achievement, 
and/or that have been used in similar studies: (a) gender (Gilleece, Cosgrove, & Sofroniou, 2010; 
OECD, 2007; Tomul & Sebile Savasci, 2012), (b) interest in science  (Krapp & Prenzel, 2011), (c) 
SES (Gilleece et al.,2010; Nichols et al., 2012; OECD, 2007; Tomul & Sebile Savasci, 2012), and (d) 
immigration status (OECD, 2007). PISA provided information about gender and immigration status. 
Gender was re-coded as a dummy variable where 0 corresponded to males and 1 to females 
(therefore, this was a dummy code for females). Immigration status was recoded into a dummy 
variable where 0 corresponded to native students and 1 corresponded to either first or second 
generation of students (i.e. “non-native”). Moreover, PISA also provided a single continuous 
measure for both interest in science and SES, which were left unchanged.  
In addition, we were interested in those school-level variables that have been found 
significant on these set of student level variables and/or that are have been consistently used in 
similar studies: (a) gender composition of schools (e.g. Sullivan, Joshi, & Leonard, 2010), and (b) 
school SES (Gilleece et al., 2010). These variables were built from the survey and student data, and 
were included in our analysis.  
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Procedures 
 
 To answer our first research question, we used linear regression. As factors and covariates 
we included: (a) the three country dummy variables – which is our independent variable (IV) of 
interest, (b) internal influence on budgeting and staffing (IBS), (c) internal influence on instructional 
content and assessment practices (IIA), (d) external influence on budgeting and staffing (EBS), (e) 
external influence on instructional content and assessment practices (EIA), and (f) inverse parental 
pressure (PP). The final model is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
  
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐾𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐼𝐵𝑆𝑗 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑆𝑗 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐸𝐼𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑗  
 
Where: 
𝛽1= coefficient for Australia  
𝛽2= coefficient for Korea  
𝛽3= coefficient for Portugal  
𝛽4= coefficients for Internal Influence on Budgeting and Staffing 
𝛽5= coefficients for Internal Influence on Instructional Content and Assessment Practices 
𝛽6= coefficients for External Influence on Budgeting and Staffing 
𝛽7= coefficients for External Influence on Instructional Content and Assessment Practices 
𝛽8= coefficients for Parental Pressure 
 
 
Fig. 1. Regression Analysis 
 
To answer our second question, we used hierarchical linear modelling. This technique has 
been used in similar analyses (e.g. Gilleece et al., 2010; Koretz, McCaffrey, & Sullivan, 2001; OECD, 
2007) because data are nested and applying general linear models might inflate type I error rates by 
underestimating the standard error of estimates. In our analysis, the dependent variable was science 
achievement.  
 PISA provides data that are nested in three levels: students nested in schools, and schools 
nested in countries. To determine if a two- or three-level model was most appropriate, we 
conducted an unconditional three-level model to understand the structure of the explained variance. 
We decided to use a two-level model because it is easier to interpret and it was reasonable given that 
the variance explained by the country level was only 5%. A 5% of variance explained is low and is 
almost half of what was found for all the countries according to OECD (2007).  
The hierarchical linear model was built using a multistep approach. This approach allows us 
to consider all the relevant variables while keeping the model at its simplest. First, we fit a fully 
unconditional two-level model to estimate the variance components at each level. Second, we added 
the four level-1 predictors previously selected: gender, SES, interest in science, and immigration 
status. The two dummy variables (gender and immigration status) were un-centered, and the two 
continuous variables (SES and interest) were group centered. We only retained those predictors that 
contributed significantly to the explanation of the level-1 variance. Third, we added the 
accountability variable as a level-2 predictor for the intercept and slopes. We retained the predictor 
in the intercept and in the slopes where it contributed significantly to the explanation of the school 
variance. Fourth, we added the remaining predictors for the corresponding intercept and slopes. Not 
all level-2 predictors were included in all the slopes’ equations. The level-2 predictors were selected 
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based on the conceptual relation existing between the variables. For the intercept we added all level-
2 variables. For the gender slope, we only added the percentage of females in the corresponding 
school. For the immigration status, we only added the country dummy variables. For the SES level, 
we only added the mean SES of the school attended. For the interest in science we only added the 
percentage of females in the corresponding schools. The final model only retained those predictors 
that were relevant in explaining the variance across levels, after adding these predictors. A summary 
of all the continuous variables considered in this model is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables  
   Measure No. Min. Max. M S.D. Skewness 
Student-level 
Science Achievement 30,066 130.30 841.04 508.92 97.48 -.141 
Interest 30,066 50.35 904.82 488.95 98.76 -.269 
SES 29,822 -3.90 3.35 .01 .96 -.344 
School-level 
Accountability  794 8.00 16.00 12.10 2.00 .053 
School SES 849 -2.06 1.59 -.03 .59 -.520 
Percentage of Girls 831 0.00 1.00 .49 .22 .120 
 
We used full maximum likelihood procedures to estimate the parameters. All level-2 
predictors, except for the countries’ dummy variables, were grand-mean centered. Missing data were 
eliminated from the analyses. The software used to conduct the analyses was HLM.  
 
Results 
 
In relation to our first research question, the estimates for the regression analysis are 
displayed in Table 3. The r-squared for the model was 0.24. We observe that only one of the five 
covariates had a significant coefficient: external influence on instructional content and assessment 
(EIA). This result could suggest that accountability practices are externally driven. All three 
coefficients for the dummy variables corresponding to different countries were significant and 
negative. USA was the reference category, so this result means that USA has significantly higher 
levels of school accountability, in relation to the other selected countries. To determine if 
accountability rates differed across the countries, we examined the 95% confidence intervals for 
their coefficients, which are displayed in Table 4. 
As seen in Table 4, the coefficient for Korea is not significantly different from that of 
Australia or that of Portugal; the confidence intervals for their estimates overlap. However, the 
coefficients from Australia and Portugal are significantly different. Therefore, there is a difference in 
the levels of school accountability practices for most pair of countries. However, there are no 
significant differences between Korea and Portugal, and Korea and Australia. A summary of these 
results are presented in Table 5. Significant differences are indicated by a “yes” in the pairwise table.  
 
 
 
 
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 23 No. 112 12 
 
Table 3 
Predictors and Hypothesis Tests 
Parameter β S.E t Sig. 
Intercept 15.155 0.681 22.252 <0.001 
     
Australia -1.790 0.188 -9.567 <0.001 
Korea -2.030 0.215 -9.424 <0.001 
Portugal -2.849 0.226 -12.589 <0.001 
EBS -0.073 0.075 -0.967 0.334 
EIA -0.208 0.071 -2.916 0.004 
IBS -0.059 0.068 -0.870 0.385 
IIA 0.113 0.067 1.693 0.091 
PPa 0.051 0.100 0.511 0.610 
Note. EBS=External Influence on Budgeting and Staffing. EIA=External Influence on 
Instructional Content and Assessment Practices. IBS= Internal Influence on Budgeting and 
Staffing. EIS= External Influence on Instructional Content and Assessment Practices.  
aInversed 
 
In relation to our second research question, the results of the hierarchical linear regression 
are presented in Tables 6(fixed parameters) and 7 (random parameters). There are five models 
presented in this table: Model 1 corresponds to the fully unconditional two-level model; Model 2 
includes the level-1 predictors; in Model 3 we added the accountability predictor (level-2), after 
retaining the significant level-1 predictors; Model 4 includes all the level-2 predictors; Model 5 
corresponds to the final model, after removing the non-significant level-2 predictors.  
 
Table 4 
Confidence Intervals for Countries’ Parameters 
Parameters 95% C.I. 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Australia -1.978 -1.602 
Korea -2.245 -1.815 
Portugal -3.075 -2.623 
 
Table 5 
Pairwise Comparison of Countries’ Coefficients 
 USA Australia Korea Portugal 
1. USA - Yes  Yes Yes 
2. Australia  - No Yes 
3. Korea   - No 
4. Portugal    - 
 
As observed in Table 6 under Model 1, the predicted mean science achievement is 508, 
which is higher than the mean for all students who took the assessment across all countries. The 
average science plausible value for the complete PISA database varies between 19 and 913 points, 
with a mean of 476 points. Also, the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) for Model 1 is 28%; this 
means that 28% of the variance at the student level is explained by school level factors. The gender, 
SES, interest in science, and immigration status predictors were added in Model 2.  
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Table 6  
Model Comparison: Fixed Effects 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 507.6 **(1.9) 523.3** (3.0) 523.3** (3.1) 505.2** (6.0) 528.4*    (5.1) 
Level-1      
    Gender   -2.4*    (1.2) -2.4*   (1.2) -1.9     (1.1) -2.13     (1.2) 
    SES  23.3** (0.8) 23.4** (0.8) 23.6** (0.8) 23.53** (0.8) 
    Interest  0.1** (0.0) 0.1** (0.0) 0.1** (0.0) 0.10** (0.0) 
    Immigration  -13.0** (2.0) -13.0** (2.0) -18.0** (4.3) -23.6** (4.2) 
Level-2      
Intercept      
    Accountability   0.2   (1.5) 0.2     (0.7) -1.4*   (0.7) 
    Mean SES    67.6** (2.4) 64.8** (2.5) 
    Girls (%)    -11.7     (6.5)              --   
    Australia    14.4*   (6.8) -7.9     (6.1) 
    Korea    -54.9   (80.4)       -- 
    Portugal    53.1** (9.6) 26.2**  9.0) 
Gender      
    Accountability   0.3   (0.6)    --    -- 
    Girls (%)    0.7     (5.9)    -- 
SES      
    Accountability   1.3** (0.4) 0.9*    (0.4) 0.9*   (0.4) 
    Mean SES    7.1**  (1.4) 7.0** (1.4) 
Interest      
    Accountability   0.0   (0.0)      --     -- 
    Girls (%)    0.0     (0.0)     -- 
Immigration      
    Accountability   0.6   (0.9)      --      -- 
    Australia    9.7*   (4.8) 15.4** (4.8) 
    Korea    87.7   (80.2)       -- 
    Portugal    -20.6** (7.4) -14.8*  (7.3) 
Note. “- -” denote the parameters that were not estimated for the corresponding model.  
*p<.05, **p<.01 
 
From Table 6 we note that the coefficients corresponding to these variables are all 
significantly different from zero. We observe that for a given school, the predicted science 
achievement of a native male with average SES and interest is 523 points. This average decreases to 
508 for a first or second generation female. And these values increase in 23 points for each unit 
increase in the difference between SES and the mean SES for the corresponding school. The effect 
of the interest in science, albeit significant, is limited. Last, the percent of level-1 variance explained 
by these predictors is 10%. Table 7 shows that including the level-1 predictors results in a 10% 
reduction in the unexplained variance (from 6,689 to 6,021).  
In relation to Model 3, two things are noted. First, accountability was only significant in 
explaining the variance of the slopes for the SES variable. The interpretation is that for each unit 
increase in the accountability level, in relation to the grand-mean, the effect of SES on science 
achievement increases on average, 1.3 points. Second, the inclusion of the accountability predictor 
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accounted for a small portion of the between-school variance components. Again, as shown in 
Table 7, all the variance components for the random effects were significantly different than zero.  
On the other hand, Model 4 shows that, in terms of predictors, neither the dummy variable 
for Korea nor the percentage of females in the classrooms were significant in their corresponding 
equations. School level accountability practices remained irrelevant to explain the variance of the level-
1 intercept. However, the rest of the coefficients (Portugal, Australia, and Mean SES) were significant 
in this regard. Indeed, as shown in Table 7, the percent of between-school variance explained by  
this model is considerably better than the previous one. Again, all variance components for the  
random effects were significantly different from zero. The percentage of variance explained for the 
rest of the level-1 predictors was not very high, yet some improvements were observed in relation to 
the gender, SES, and immigration predictors. 
 
Table 7  
Model Comparison: Random Effects 
Parametera Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Level -1      
      Intercept  6,688.84 6,021.74 6,021.94 6,027.89 6,026.55 
Level -2      
      Intercept 2,658.47** 3,542.63** 3,554.97** 2,047.22** 2,168.50** 
      Gender  133.21** 130.05** 126.05** 127.54** 
      SES  170.32** 163.46** 153.16** 152.68** 
      Interest  0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
      Immigration  361.49** 363.29** 328.48** 324.08** 
Note. “- -” denote those parameters that were not estimated for the corresponding model.  
aVariance components. Covariance estimates are not included in this table. 
*p<.05, **p<.01 
 
  Model 5 corresponds to the final model. The predictor for accountability was retained on 
the basis that removing the other non-significant predictors, made it significantly different to zero in 
the equation for the level-1 intercept. On the other hand, we note that the percent of level-2 
variance explained by this model is similar but slightly higher than that of the previous model with 
all level-2 predictors (model 4). Again, all the variance components for the random coefficients were 
significantly different than zero. 
The data from this last model suggests several points, although they are not straightforward 
given the number of predictors at each level. For an average student attending an average school (as 
defined by the selected variables) from the U.S. or Korea, the mean predicted science achievement is 
528 points. This predicted mean reduces to 526 for a similar female student, and to 503 if she is 
either a first or second generation in the corresponding country. Students who have a one-unit 
higher SES level than that their peers, obtain on average scores that are higher by 23 points. This is a 
relevant result given that the standard deviation for the individual SES variable in this sample was 
approximately 0.96 points. Moreover, this effect is higher for schools with higher mean SES. On the 
other hand, despite that the coefficient for the interest in science is small, the scale of this variable is 
similar to the scale of the science achievement and so one standard deviation increment in the 
interest in science, produces nine points of difference in science achievement.  
In relation to the results pertaining to accountability, one unit increase in the school level 
accountability practices, in relation to the grand mean for this sample, decreases the expected mean 
science achievement by 1.44 points. However, there is a positive interaction between school level 
accountability and individual SES. Students with higher SES than their peers would get additional 
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0.88 points for each unit increase in their individual SES in relation to the school mean (beyond the 
23 points increase they get for such difference). Therefore, these results indicate that: (a) the effect 
that school accountability practices have on science achievement, is small and negative; (b) the effect 
of accountability is not independent of the SES level of the student.  
 
Discussion 
 
The purpose of this study was to gain insight on the relationship between accountability and 
science achievement. Science achievement is often considered critical to nations, yet it is rarely the 
focus of studies that look at the relationship between accountability and students’ outcomes. In 
particular, we focused on the relationship that a number of school level accountability practices had 
with science achievement, across four countries: Australia, South Korea, Portugal, and the United 
States. To that end, we first sought to determine if there were significant differences between the 
extents of school level accountability practices across these countries at the time when data were 
collected. Using linear regression analysis, we concluded that there were differences in this regard 
between pairs of countries, but not all pairs of countries were significantly different from each other. 
On average, the United States had higher levels of school accountability practices than the rest of 
the countries. Australia had higher levels of school accountability practices than Portugal, but not 
from Korea. In fact, Korea was not significantly different from either Australia or Portugal under 
this metric.  
These school accountability practices did not necessarily emerge from accountability systems 
in place. However, these differential levels matched the expectations entailed by such systems for 
each country at that time. By 2006, the United States had already in place a system of high-stakes 
state accountability and it is therefore expected that schools endorsed accountability practices such 
as the ones that we considered in this analysis. Despite not having a national accountability system 
by that time, Australia had several systems of school level accountability in place. These systems 
varied by territory/states and typically included school monitoring practices carried internally and 
externally (Gurr, 2007). On the other hand, Korea had a national testing system in place but its reach 
or stakes were not transformed into a census high-stakes accountability system until 2008. And 
Portugal had a low-stakes national testing program operating at the time.  
Beyond the differences in school level accountability practices, we looked at the relationship 
that these practices had with science achievement, using multilevel analysis. We did not hypothesize 
any result because the relationship between accountability and achievement is “varied, limited, and 
relatively inconclusive” (Nichols et al. 2012, p. 26). Moreover, potentially stable relationships 
identified in the literature do not refer to science achievement. Our results indicate that the 
relationship that school level accountability practices have with science achievement is small, and 
mostly, negative. In particular, school level accountability practices were relevant in explaining mean 
science achievement2 and the effect that individual SES had on this predicted mean. The results 
from this study suggest that the effect that school level accountability practices have on science 
achievement, as measured by PISA data, is not independent from the SES of the students. In 
particular, these accountability practices may be more beneficial for students with high SES, when 
compared to their school peers.  
Other outcomes are worth noting. The model confirms that the effect that individual SES 
has on science achievement is huge, as indicated by innumerable studies that have looked at this 
relationship across different subjects. A result that was not in line with our expectations was that the 
                                                 
2 For non-immigrant men with SES and interest levels as the mean from their school peers. 
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percentage of females in a classroom did not affect the mean science achievement. This does not 
support studies that have found that the sex-composition of schools is related to differential 
achievement outcomes for girls (e.g. Gándara & Silva, 2015). A possible explanation is that the 
effect that sex-composition has on science achievement varies across countries. Last, being an 
immigrant was on average, associated with lower science achievement. This finding was true for all 
countries, but it was considerably better for immigrants in Australia, a result that may deserve 
further exploration.    
With regards to the limitations, it is important to remember that this is a correlational 
analysis and we are not attributing a causal effect from accountability on science achievement. Any 
cross-cultural interpretation of students’ performance on international assessment needs to take into 
consideration the educational realities of the countries (Kim, Lavonen, & Ogawa, 2009). Because of 
this, we included several covariates identified as relevant by previous research. However, we could 
not include all the variables we intended, because there was incomplete information. For example, it 
is said that Korean success in scientific literacy is partly due to the large investments in private 
education, sector in which parents play a fundamental role (Kim et al., 2009), but we could not 
include the type of school funding (private vs. public) because the data were not available for one of 
the countries. Another limitation is that science achievement measured by PISA is not linked to the 
curriculum and therefore, results may be different using other outcome, specially, one with high-
stakes attached. Moreover, we used data for 15-year-olds only, and it is possible that the stability of 
the results change across grade levels and ages. Research shows that the correlation between 
measures related to accountability and achievement change not only by subject but also by grade 
(Nichols et al., 2012). Also, there are many sources of incomparability related to international 
assessments (Ercickan, Roth, & Asil, 2015), and we did not validate the comparability of the 
measures but assumed them as comparable. Last, the school level accountability practices herein 
considered are limited to what was asked in questions 15 and 17 from the PISA school 
questionnaire. We recognize that these questions do not encompass all possible school level 
accountability practices, and we cannot state that they are representative of all school level 
accountability practices. For all of the above reasons, our results must be interpreted with caution. 
Notwithstanding, the skills measured by PISA are critical to any national curriculum, and we did 
control an important amount of variance with appropriate covariates, so our results should not be 
discarded on the basis of its limitations. 
Since 2006, PISA has not focused on science achievement. The next battery that will focus 
on science will be administered in 2015. Further research should follow up this study using the 2015 
data. In that context, the new question that arises is: given that Australia and Korea have increased 
their national accountability practices since 2008, how has this impacted the average school-level 
accountability practices reported in PISA? It is likely that many countries modified their national 
evaluation systems after 2006, not only Australia and Korea. Further research may look at the 
relationship between the changes in the amount of school-level accountability practices and the 
gains in science achievement. PISA’s school questionnaire has increased the number and detail of 
questions related to accountability (e.g. OECD, 2011) and we expect that the 2015 administration 
will provide rich data in this regard. Also, further research should pay closer attention to other 
school-level characteristics that could explain achievement differences across countries. For 
example, curricular differences across countries and/or the different assessment practices at a school 
level. Digging deeper into these matters may improve our understanding around the relationship of 
school level accountability practices and science achievement.  
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Appendix B 
Influences 
School Questionnaire 
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   Question 16 from PISA's School Questionnaire 
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